Auctions with Entry versus Entry in Auctions∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that an auctioneer may prefer to restrict entry by exacting an admission fee to having an extra potential bidder in an auction setting with endogenous bidder entry. We also highlight that admission fees and reserve prices are different instruments in a setting with uncertainty over entry costs, and that optimal mechanisms in such settings may be higher-dimensional than in Myerson (1981). Our results provide a counterpoint to the broad intuition of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that market thickness often takes precedence over market power in auction design. JEL Classification: D44, D47, C78, D82
منابع مشابه
The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions
At equilibrium with respect to bids, entry and information acquisition, oral auctions can generate significantly more revenue than sealed-bid auctions even in the case of independently-distributed privately-known values. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44 (auctions)
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