Equilibrium Behavior in a Model of Multilateral Negotiations∗ PRELIMINARY DRAFT
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper characterizes equilibrium behavior in multilateral negotiations, an exchange process in which a buyer attempts to purchase from one of several sellers with privately known production costs. The buyer receives an initial set of price offers, then can try to play the sellers off one another to obtain concessions. Consistent with recent experimental evidence, expected prices in the negotiations equal those in first-price auctions, despite differences in the time path of price offers. However, the buyer’s inability to commit not to haggle can lead to costly delay, and being more patient can weaken the buyer’s bargaining position.
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