Development of the Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Last Ten Years

The article discusses the Hungarian foreign policy in the last ten years. The author states the three main thrusts of the Hungarian foreign policy: the North-Atlantic and European orientation; the regional policy; and, third, supporting ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states. These three directions are analyzed in each of the three Hungarian governments between the period 1990-2000. The author maintains that there was a continuity in matters of national interest, although small differences in the foreign policy could be observed between the three governments. The author points out the differences between the Antall and Horn governments in the policies towards regionalism. Finally, the author reviews Mr. Orbán's foreign policy, which stresses continuity in each of the three areas. The author also underlines the strategic partnership with Croatia, which thus far lacks content. Ten years have elapsed since the political transition of 1990. Since then, we have had three free and democratic elections in Hungary, all of which resulted in a changing of the guard. The programs of the particular governments showed substantial differences in sectoral policies. There is, perhaps, just one governmental sphere where there has been remarkable continuity; and that is foreign policy. The strategic directions of the foreign policy of the Hungarian state were crucially determined by the program of the first democratic government. The principles laid down there appear to have stood the test of time. Naturally, there have been NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 2 (1) 2000, pp. 117-131 divergences, but at that time the tripartite character of the foreign policy orientation of a newly independent Hungary a feature that has been valid ever since was originally drafted.. What are those three main directions? The first to be mentioned is the European North-Atlantic orientation, which represented a radical break from the Soviet orientation of the pre-1990 period. For this to occur, the world political environment had to undergo a radical shift, which began with the Bush-Gorbachev talks of 1989 in Malta, the fall of the Berlin Wall marking one of the high points in that process. That shift was, at the same time, an expression of sovereign will, given that the Soviet Union still existed in 1990. It expressed the desire of the Hungarian people to return to where it had always belonged; namely, to the family of Western European civilizations. The second main direction was the special focus given to the regional policy of the country. This expressed the natural attachment which had, for centuries, bound it to its surrounding neighbors. This aspiration also reflected the recognition that the country could not be uprooted from its environment, that it could not hope to prosper unless it strove to cooperate with its neighbors neighbors with which it had frequently been in conflict in the course of history, but had, in many instances, also formed alliances. The third direction was to embrace the cause of the ethnic Hungarian minorities living across the border, which expressed the desire of Hungarian society to redefine the interests of the Hungarian nation, residing in many countries, after almost half a century of artificial separation and a lack of communication post1945. Here one must also take into account the circumstance that in the pre-1990 period despite the clauses concerning the protection of minorities in the peace treaties ending World War One, and the proclamations of the principles of the “Socialist Community” (a product of the post-World War Two constellation) and of “proletarian internationalism” there had been no general improvement in the situation of national minorities in Eastern Europe, including the ethnic Hungarian minority. All these factors engendered a demand for radical changes in this area. The first democratic government realistically assessed and charted the foreign policy course of the Hungarian state. This is eloquently attested to by the fact that this tripartite orientation has continued to command a broad consensus between successive governments and their oppositions, and that even changes of government have not produced any seismic shifts in this regard, although there may have been certain shifts in emphasis. In this article, I will attempt to show the similarities and differences among the foreign policy programs of the three governments, indicating the areas where the changes of emphasis have 118 N AT IO N AL S EC U RI TY A N D T H E FU TU RE 2 (1 ) 2 00 0 been most perceptible. I will also attempt to draw conclusions as to which aspects in the course of the implementation of a foreign policy strategy that has proved fundamentally correct have proved durable and valid, and which have proved to have been mistakes and require correction. Let us then examine the programs of the particular governments one by one. I. The foreign policy program of the Antall (Boross) government (1990-1994) The program of the HDF-ISP-CDPP government, which was known as “a program of national renewal” and which came to power in 1990 as the result of the first democratic elections may, in many respects, be regarded as the program of political transition, as it charted the main directions and priorities in the particular governmental areas and in foreign policy as well. As in all other areas, this governmental program also represented a drastic change in the area of foreign policy, compared to the previous period, even taking into account the fact that the Németh government (the last “Socialist” government), which was in power between 1989-90, proved very courageous in the foreign policy area. It utilized the available opportunities to expand the country’s room for maneuver by forging links, for example, with countries which had previously been regarded as taboo (Israel, South Korea, Republic of South Africa, etc.) and by openly defying – based upon the interests of the country some of its allies of that time (i.e. in the decision to release East German citizens). The foreign policy program of the Antall government declares: “The Republic of Hungary pursues an independent foreign policy based upon the precedence of national interests, with the aim of completely restoring our national sovereignty. We intend to express and realize our national interests in harmony with European interests and values, and with international realities. Under the conditions of the political transition, on new foundations taking into account the new requirements and opportunities arising from the altered international situation we strive to forge and maintain a balanced system of international relations.” To be sure, this represented a radical break with the policies pursued up to that point and with the existing alliance relations, signaling at the same time Hungary’s intention to again assume its place in the family of advanced democratic European countries. The government program identified the broadest possible involvement in the European integration processes as the top priority foreign policy goal. The reason for this was the need to ensure the foreign policy, security, and economic conditions necessary for the implementation of the comprehensive modernization program facing the country. Owing to the dramatic changes 119 occurring in the Eastern European region and in the EuropeanAtlantic region then in the process of formation the EuropeanAtlantic community of interests was considered pivotal for Hungarian foreign policy, and it was here that foreign policy activity was focused. Hungary was predestined to travel this road by virtue of historical, cultural, and geographical reasons, and also because its political and economic interests dictated such a course. Within the context of this so-called Euro-Atlantic orientation, contacts were made with the European Communities (the predecessor of the European Union), and with NATO, the WesternEuropean Union, and EFTA. A demand was also voiced for Hungary to establish institutional relations with these integration organizations. While the government program still mentions Comecon, since it still existed back then and Hungary was a member of the economic grouping of the eastern bloc, the emphasis was already on interests. (A short time later, Comecon announced its dissolution). In 1990, Hungary also declared its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact. Originally, a longer period was envisaged for this: i.e. the government wished to leave the military structure by December 31, 1991. That plan was thwarted by the fact that the organization was dissolved prior to that date. The government program’s enumeration of the bilateral relations which were of primary importance was also designed to indicate its Euro-Atlantic orientation. The order speaks for itself: Germany (key role), United States (special treatment), France (new stage in relations), Italy (reliable, stable partner), Austria (exceptionally good neighborly relations), Great Britain (important direction), Japan (important interests), Soviet Union (key player in the region). The desire to develop economic cooperation was given important, indeed crucial, emphasis in every single relation. Also flowing organically from the European orientation was the re-formulation of regional policy, or “neighborhood policy”, as it is sometimes called. In this area, too, the Antall government broke with the previously employed ideological clichés, placing the focus on neighborhood policy as well, and on the opportunity and the need to assert national interests. It tended to adhere to the view that since Hungary is situated midway between the West and the East, its intermediary position as a “ferry county” allows it to exploit its geographical and political situation. Also important was the fact that it lies at the juncture of the great European cultures and language families and that, as a reformist country, it had forged substantive and closer relations with the West, unlike the rest of the “Socialist” countries, while also preserving its close relations with the eastern bloc countries. Hungary’s goal was to become a regional hub. To this end, the new powerholders sought N AT IO N AL S EC U RI TY A N D T H E FU TU RE 2 (1 ) 2 00 0