Licensing under Bargaining
نویسنده
چکیده
To relax the assumption that licensees have no bargaining power, which is prevalent in the licensing literature, the Rubinstein bargaining model is integrated with a duopoly licensing model in this paper. The licensor always licenses the best technology regardless of whether the technology advances are negotiated or solely determined by the licensor. Further, royalties prove to be the only payment method. Otherwise, the choice of the payment methods depends on the licensor’s market entry decision and firms’ bargaining powers in some cases. Finally this paper presents a simple framework for analyzing the effect of the licensee bargaining power on licensing behavior.
منابع مشابه
An NTU Game Approach to Patent Licensing: Stable Bargaining Outcomes under Two Licensing Policies
By formulating negotiations about licensing payments as cooperative games without side payments, we investigate stable bargaining outcomes in licensing a cost-reducing technology of an external patent holder to oligopolistic firms producing a homogeneous product under two licensing policies: fee and royalty. The final bargaining outcome in fee licensing is uniquely determined, because the NTU b...
متن کاملBargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a Cournot market. Our results are as follows: Under each permissible coalition structure including the grand coalition, the patent holder can extract the entire profits of all licensees in the bargaining set for a coalition structure when the number of firms is large, so the optim...
متن کاملStable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes
Considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as the bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The cores for coalition structures are empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give the necessary and sufficient condition for the core (for the grand coalition) ...
متن کاملAsymptotic Properties of the Shapley Value of Patent Licensing Games
We study the asymptotic properties of the Shapley value of patent licensing games with the Cournot competition, shedding light on its relations to the nucleolus, core and bargaining set. The Shapley value of the outside patentee of a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation converges to 2(a − c), which coincides with the patentee’s profit through non-cooperative licensing by means of upfront fee (o...
متن کاملBargaining in the shadow of precedent: the surprising irrelevance of asymmetric stakes
We develop a model of bargaining and litigation in the context of patent licensing (or any contractual setting). Following Priest and Klein (1984) we developed a model that explicitly allows for (1) multiple parties (leading to asymmetry of stakes), (2) binding precedent, and (3) pre-dispute bargaining done in the “shadow” of precedent-setting courts. The pre-dispute bargaining creates an endog...
متن کامل