Controlling Elections by Replacing Candidates or Votes
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider elections where the chair replaces either candidates or votes, with the goal of making a specific candidate win (constructive control) or lose (destructive control). We call this “replacement control” and study its computational complexity for several scoring rules (plurality, veto, Borda, k-approval), as well as for approval voting.
منابع مشابه
Controlling Elections by Replacing Candidates: Theoretical and Experimental Results
We consider elections where the chair may attempt to influence the result by replacing candidates with the intention to make a specific candidate lose (destructive control). We call this form of control “replacement control” and we study its computational complexity. We focus in particular on Plurality and Veto, for which we prove that destructive control via replacing candidates is computation...
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