From Kosovo to Karabakh: International Responses to De Facto States

Both in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, the dominant international response to de facto states, or quasi-states, has been one of isolation; they violate the principle of territorial integrity, they are often based on warfare, and the legitimacy of their frequently ethnically-based claims to independence is rejected. This article finds that pragmatism has occasionally led to some form of reluctant engagement, but this has been ad hoc and its depoliticised nature has been stressed. De facto states have been viewed solely through the lens of ethnicity and there has been insufficient understanding of internal dynamics. International policies for Kosovo have long impacted on the strategies adopted by other de facto states and recent developments have reignited hopes for recognition. The US and the EU have rejected any talk of a legal precedent, but Kosovoʹs recognition does have important political consequences; it introduces a new dynamism into currently stalled peace processes. This could lead to a hardening of positions, but it could also positively impact on the internal dynamics of the de facto states. The recent recognition of Kosovoʹs independence has been followed with great interest in other de facto states whose leaderships hope that this case will set a precedent and hence increase their chance of international recognition.1 This interpretation has been echoed by Russia in its fierce criticism of the decision by states such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany to accept Kosovoʹs unilateral declaration of independence. As Vladimir Putin put it before the recognition, If someone believes that Kosovo should be granted full independence as a state, then why should we deny it to the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians?2 * Nina Caspersen, PhD, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Politics, Lancaster University, UK 1 De facto states, quasi-states, unrecognised states, pseudo states or separatist states are entities that have achieved de facto independence, often through warfare, but not international recognition; examples include Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam, and Transnistria. 2 Robert PARSONS, »Russia: Is Putin Looking To Impose Solutions To Frozen Conflicts?«, in: RFE/RL, 2 February 2006. From Kosovo to Karabakh: International Responses to De Facto States The states that recognised Kosovoʹs independence have, on the other hand, argued that Kosovo is unique and that its recognition, therefore, does not set a dangerous precedent which might encourage other secessionist movements. But even if it does not set a legal precedent it will have consequences of a more political nature; it affects the calculations made in other entities that have achieved de facto independence. The decision to recognise Kosovoʹs independence could be interpreted as signifying an important change in international attitudes to de facto states. These entities have commonly been seen as criminalised, ethnic fiefdoms that constitute a threat to security; they have violated the principle of territorial integrity, and its internal substitute uti possidetis, and have mostly been regarded as pariahs with whom any form of engagement is ill-advised. This article examines international responses to de facto states in the Balkans and the Caucasus; specifically Republika Srpska Krajina (Croatia), Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina [henceforth Bosnia]), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and Kosovo (Serbia, until recently). It finds that territorial integrity has been the guiding principle along with a strictly ethnically-based understanding of these entities. Pragmatism has in some cases ruled and de facto states have reluctantly been accepted as negotiating partners and aid recipients, but this has been on an ad hoc basis and without clear direction. International responses have overall been characterised by a marked reluctance to engage and by a limited understanding of internal dynamics. With the recognition of Kosovo, a new possibility has emerged: could reluctant engagement be transformed into full-blown acceptance, or is Kosovo indeed a one-off? Such questions introduce a new fluidity into hitherto stalled peace processes since they are likely to impact not only on the strategies adopted by the de facto states but also on the willingness of their ʹparent statesʹ to compromise. The prospect of independence could lead to a hardening of positions on both sides but it could conceivably also have a positive impact on the internal dynamics of the entities and hence on the stalled peace processes. Self-Determination in a Time of Territorial Integrity Notwithstanding the many independent states that emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the recognition of new states remains a rare event, especially if independence is contested by the ʹparent stateʹ. Since 1965, only five conflicts involving self-determination disputes resulted in independence for substate entities. But even though the odds are against them, entities that have achieved de facto independence maintain an aspiration for inter-