Biclique Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Block Ciphers PRESENT, Piccolo and LED

Abstract. In this paper, we evaluate the security of lightweight block ciphers PRESENT, Piccolo and LED against biclique cryptanalysis. To recover the secret key of PRESENT-80/128, our attacks require 2 full PRESENT-80 encryptions and 2 full PRESENT-128 encryptions, respectively. Our attacks on Piccolo-80/128 require computational complexities of 2 and 2, respectively. The attack on a 29-round reduced LED-64 needs 2 29-round reduced LED-64 encryptions. In the cases of LED-80/96/128, we propose the attacks on two versions. First, to recover the secret key of 45-round reduced LED-80/96/128, our attacks require computational complexities of 2, 2 and 2, respectively. To attack the full version, we require computational complexities of 2, 2 and 2, respectively. However, in these cases, we need the full codebook. These results are superior to known biclique cryptanalytic results on them.