The Politics of Federal Grants: Presidential influence over the Distribution of Federal Funds
نویسندگان
چکیده
Do presidents use federal grants to help win elections? While a significant amount of research examines whether political actors allocate funds for electoral reasons, most focuses on legislators’ influence. This paper argues that the president and his subordinates strategically direct federal funding toward electorally competitive states. It uses a newly compiled database that includes all federal project grants from 1996-2008 to examine the distribution of grant money across the 50 states. It finds that the executive branch delivers more money and grants to swing states than all other states. Further, the proximity of a presidential election enhances this swing state bias in the distribution of funds. The paper concludes that presidential electoral interest drives the distribution of funds and, that scholars must consider the role of the president in studies of distributive politics. Working Paper: 01-2011 Research Concentration: Executive Politics and Regulatory Policymaking
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