Infinitely Split Nash Equilibrium Problems in Repeated Games

9814 Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payo...

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Core Discussion Paper 9814 Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payo...

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Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payo...

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9814 LOSS AVERSION IN REPEATED GAMES Jonathan Shalev

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payo...

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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for non-cooperative games, defines all Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games. Here, we prove that Nash equilibria that are not characterise...

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Infinitely Split Nash Equilibrium Problems in Repeated Games

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9814 Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

Core Discussion Paper 9814 Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

9814 LOSS AVERSION IN REPEATED GAMES Jonathan Shalev

On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem

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