Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
1 **This paper has existed in various forms since the 1980's. The most recent working-paper version is Maskin and Riley (1996). We thank B. Lebrun for helpful comments and the NSF for research support.
منابع مشابه
Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high - bid auctions ✩ Eric Maskin
For the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high-bid auction is unique when (i) buyers’ reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint; (ii) buyers have private values; and (iii) buyers’ preferences are log supermodular. For more than two buyers, we obtain the same result under the additional assum...
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There is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high-bid auctions (auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid). See for example, Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Matthews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), Holt (1980), Cox, Smith and Walker (1988). A critical property on which this literature relies is the existen...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003