Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
1 This research was supported by NSF Grants SBR 9730364 and SBR 9730187. Many thanks to Vince Crawford, Drew Fudenberg, David Hsia, John Kagel, and Xin Wang for discussions and help. Helpful comments were also received from seminar participants at Berkeley, Caltech, Harvard, Hong Kong UST, and Wharton. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125 [email protected]
منابع مشابه
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Sophisticated Ewa Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e. they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payo information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teachi...
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Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payo® information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experienceweighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teach...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 104 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002