On stability of Nash equilibrium situations and Pareto optimal situations in finite games
نویسندگان
چکیده
A non-cooperative finite game of several persons is considered in the case, where payoff functions are linear. Extreme levels of independent perturbations of payoff functions parameters, which remain Nash and Pareto optimality of a situation, are specified. Necessary and sufficient conditions of such stability are stated. AMS Mathematics Subject Classification : 90C27, 90C29.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- The Computer Science Journal of Moldova
دوره 11 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003