Corporate governance change and performance: The roles of traditional mechanisms in France and South Korea ¬リニ

The agency theory upholds shareholder value orientation and suggests the consolidation of monitoring mechanisms in order to correct inappropriate behaviors of managers and consequently, to improve corporate performance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Contrary to the theoretical prescription, however, shareholder-oriented mechanisms are not fully implemented, but practically coexist with traditional governance mechanisms, such as controlling shareholders’ concentrated ownership, government’s influence or family’s involvement in management, in non-US countries. The symbolic management perspective explains this phenomenon as decoupling, which is facilitated by the contestation between the performance dimension of shareholder-oriented mechanisms and sociopolitical responses of traditional mechanisms in a firm (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1998, 2001). The two theoretical approaches Scandinavian Journal of Management (2015) 31, 40—53