Commitment using punishment.
نویسندگان
چکیده
Experimental parameters were adjusted so that pigeons' pairwise choices among three alternatives reflected the following order of preference: (a) a smaller-sooner reinforcer, (b) a larger-later reinforcer, and (c) the smaller-sooner reinforcer followed by a punishment (consisting of an extended blackout period). After this order of preference was established, the pigeons were exposed to a two-link, concurrent-chain-like choice procedure. One terminal link consisted of a choice between the smaller-sooner and the larger-later reinforcer; the other terminal link was identical to the first except that the smaller-sooner reinforcer was followed by blackout punishment. The pigeons' preference (in their initial-link choice) for the terminal link with the punished smaller-sooner alternative increased as the delay between the initial and terminal links increased. By choosing this terminal link, the pigeons are said to have "committed" themselves to obtaining the larger-later reinforcer. However, unlike prior studies of commitment (e.g., Rachlin & Green, 1972), it was still possible after making the commitment for the pigeons to choose the smaller-sooner reinforcer and undergo the punishment. The pigeons did in fact occasionally make this highly deleterious choice.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior
دوره 65 3 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1996