Although revisited ∗

This paper offers an analysis of the meaning of although set within the framework of Relevance Theory. In line with Iten (1998b), although is seen as encoding procedural information that constrains the inferential processes involved in the derivation of implicatures. However, the current account differs from Iten (1998b) in several points. First, it suggests that utterances of the form Q although P or Although P, Q encode a single logical form that can be developed into a single proposition expressed. Second, it proposes that the procedural meaning of although indicates that the hearer is to suspend an inference. 1 Differences between but and although It seems uncontentious that (1a) and (b) can receive the same (‘concessive’) interpretation as (2). (1) a. Peter went out although it was raining. b. Although it was raining, Peter went out. (2) It was raining but Peter went out. This is reflected in much of the literature, where Q although P/Although P, Q is treated as having a subset of the interpretations possible for P but Q. For instance, König (1985) describes P but Q as the prototypical means of expressing an ‘adversative’ relation, while he sees Q although P/Although P, Q as the prototypical ‘concessive’ expression. According to him (1985: 4), concessives have the properties in (3). ∗ This paper differs minimally from chapter 6 of Iten (2000). As always, I’m grateful to Robyn Carston for many helpful and inspiring discussions on the topic of this paper.