Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
نویسنده
چکیده
*The original version of this paper was written for the Office of ASPER of the U.S. Department of Labor in 1975. This is a revision of ‘Unemployment insurance as a social insurance program’ presented at the ISPE Conference on Social Insurance held near Tokyo. Japan in May 1977. I would like to thank participants at this conference, M.A. Baily, G.S. Fields and the referees for helpful comments. My recent work on this topic has been funded by the National Science Foundation.
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