Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in Undiscounted Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in nonstationary undiscounted infinite horizon dynamic games, by exploiting a structural property (Uniformly Bounded Reachability) of the state dynamics. This allows us to identify a suitable finite horizon equilibrium relaxation, the ending state Constrained MPE, that captures the relevant features of an infinite horizon MPE for a long enough horizon. An application to an asynchronous dynamic duopoly is presented.
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