Ethical concerns in primate use and husbandry.

Subsequent to World War II, a dramatic increase occurred in the utilization of nonhuman primates in biomedical and psychological research and industry. At the same time field studies on the ecological and social behavior of natural populations of primates also increased, making possible more realistic assessments of both the behavioral potentiality of primate populations and their conservation status. In spite of the growing body of information indicating the endangered or threatened status of most species, many laboratory workers and planning agencies continue to regard primates as renewable resources, even seeking to bypass protective legislation in habitat countries to obtain them. As a consequence, insufficient financial support has been made available for the development of breeding colonies for research programs which may be essential. However, much utilization of primates is open to question. The appropriateness of primates as models, the numbers of animals used in experiments, and the redundancy of experimentation frequently are given little consideration. Likewise, field data on the biological and social requirements of primates have been consistently ignored in housing and other aspects of care, thereby calling into question the results of much research. The lack of restraint on the utilization of primates (and other animals) in research may ultimately be a consequence of the man/nature dichotomy embedded in traditional interpretations of judea-Christian thought. A symposium devoted to the examination of scientific and philosophical issues surrounding the use of primates other than humans in biomedical research and testing is warranted for at least two reasons. (1) Much of the use of primates in biomedical research is justified on the grounds that they are "essential" because of their taxonomic closeness to humans. Such an attitude may have the effect of diverting researchers from the use of more appropriate models and may even impede the development of alternatives to the use of primates and other live animals. The decision to use a primate as an experimental model or for testing must be recognized as entirely a human decision, not something inherent in the fact of evolution. *Dr. Eudey is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557 and Co-chairwoman of the International Primate Protection League, P.O. Drawer X, Summerville, SC 29483. This paper was prepared for and presented at the Institute for the Study of Animal Problems symposium on Nonhuman Primates in Biomedical Programs, 15 October 1980, San Francisco, California. Previously published symposium papers: j.R. Held, Breeding and Use of Nonhuman Primates in the USA; A.N. Rowan, Scientific Issues and Regulation of Primate Use (lnt 1 Stud Anim Prob 2(1), 1981). /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 2(2} 1981 96 Review Article A. Eudey (2) In contrast to other animals used for experimental purposes, the majority of primates have been wild-caught and, to all appearances, would continue to be wild-caught if it were not for the fact that habitat countries increasingly are imposing quotas and bans on their export. All populations of primates must be considered potentially vulnerable because the habitats essential for their survival, frequently rainforest or deciduous forest in developing countries, are being steadily encroached upon and exploited by the expanding human population. For example, during this century the lion-tailed macaque (Macaca silenus), which is found only in the Western Ghats of south India, has been reduced by human activity to a few small, discontinuous populations perhaps totalling no more than 400 monkeys (Green and Minkowski, 1977). The vulnerability of some primates has been exacerbated by trapping for export. The stumptail macaque (Macaca arctoides), which is rare throughout its range in southern and southeast Asia, has been brought near to extinction in peninsular Thailand, the principal area in which it was trapped until the government of Thailand imposed a total ban on the export of primates in 1976 (Eudey, 1978). In recognition of their vulnerable status all primate species appear on either Appendix I (species threatened by extinction) or Appendix II (species which may become threatened with extinction without regulation of trade) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which was drafted in 1973 to insure international cooperation in protecting wild populations of animals and plants from exploitation through international traffic. Ethics and the Darwinian Revolution In order to discuss ethical concerns relating to the use and husbandry of primates, a definition of ethics is necessary. One meaning of the word is the "rules or standards governing the conduct of the members of a profession."' Another meaning is the "philosophy of morals" or the "study of the general nature of morals and of specific moral choices to be made by the individual in his relationship with others." In this context ethics stresses "objectively defined, although essentially idealistic, standards of right and wrong." If one were to expand the concept of "others" beyond our own species to include other species, then it should be possible to speak of a series of rules or ethics by which the conduct of those members of the biomedical community using primates is governed. However, it is my contention that the assumptions which currently underlie decisions as to what is ethically right or wrong with respect to the use of primates may require re-examination. Ideas expressed in the U.S. National Primate Plan, which was prepared by the Interagency Primate Steering Committee in 1978, will facilitate some of this review. In a 1972 article entitled "The nature of the Darwinian revolution," Ernst Mayr points out that only one of the few scientific revolutions, i.e., "rather drastic revisions of previously maintained assumptions and concepts," which has occurred involves the biological sciences rather than the physical sciences. This is the Darwinian revolution based upon the idea that natural selection or dif~ ferential reproduction is the most important, although not the exclusive, cause of evolutionary change. Mayr (1972:981) contends that this may be the "most fundamental of all intellectual revolutions in the history of mankind" because it affects religion, philosophy, and ethics as well as science. The following two conse97 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 2(2) 1981 Review Article A.Eudey quences of the Darwinian revolution are important to the topic under present consideration: (1) The refutation of the idea that evolutionary change is synonymous with progress, which is the direct outgrowth of the idea that all organisms occupy a link in a Chain of Being or rung in a Ladder of Perfection created in its present order by God, and thereby, of creationism itself, in that evolutionary change by adaptation does not necessitate continuous betterment. (2) The abolition of anthropocentrism, the concept that human beings are the central fact of the universe, by the idea that humans are part of the stream of evolution and occupy a place in nature with other organisms. These two aspects of the Darwinian revolution may be ignored or even rejected by scientists. The tendency to look at other species, including other primates, from the standpoint of one's own specialization, rather than assuming an holistic or evolutionary perspective, may be a contributing factor. The very terms commonly used to refer to primates other than humansnonhuman and subhumanreflect the pervasiveness of both anthropocentrism and creationism. The prefix "sub," which literally means "under or beneath" and also "inferior or secondary in rank" or "somewhat short of or less than," is especially pejorative. In 1972 at the IYth Congress of the International Primatological Society, Earl Count attempted to circumvent this bias by introducing the term alloprimates, which means simply "other primates." The Chain of Being or Ladder of Perfection is a static doctrine that recognizes no evolutionary transformations but only gradations in the supposed complexities of organisms. Following this line of reasoning, those animals ranked or classified as being closest to humans, the other primates, would appear asappropriate substitutes for ourselves. This kind of thinking may be in evidence in the National Primate Plan (IPSC, 1978) in statements such as the following: The essentiality of their use rests in large extent upon the relation of the nonhuman primates to the human primateman. These animals are man's closest relatives in the animal kingdom and are therefore indispensable allies in the effort to understand and control problems of human health (pages 1-2). The chimpanzee is the irreplaceable model for the study of human health problems. The alternative subject for such studies is man himself .... As man's surrogate for evaluation of many health hazards and health protective measures, this animal is without equal (page 62, emphasis added). The ultimate effect of such thinking, as I mentioned initially in this paper, may be to discourage the use of and search for alternatives to primates in biomedical research. At best it does not promote such use or search. For example, in a recent letter to Science (209:214, 1980), Dr. joe R. Held, former chairman of the National Institutes of Health Interagency Primate Steering Committee, makes the following statement: ... there are searchers for alternatives (to the use of research animals) for economic as well as humane reasons, but. .. it is unlikely alternatives will greatly reduce the number of animals needed in research and testing in the foreseeable future ... the /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 2(2) 1981 98 Review Article A. Eudey (2) In contrast to other animals used for experimental purposes, the majority of primates have been wild-caught and, to all appearances, would continue to be wild-caught if it were not for the fact that habitat countries increasingly are imposing quotas and bans on their export. All populations of primates must be considered potentially vulnerable because the habitats essential for their survival, frequently rainforest or deciduous forest in developing countries, are being steadily encroached upon and exploited by the expanding human population. For example, during this century the lion-tailed macaque (Macaca silenus), which is found only in the Western Ghats of south India, has been reduced by human activity to a few small, discontinuous populations perhaps totalling no more than 400 monkeys (Green and Minkowski, 1977). The vulnerability of some primates has been exacerbated by trapping for export. The stumptail macaque (Macaca arctoides), which is rare throughout its range in southern and southeast Asia, has been brought near to extinction in peninsular Thailand, the principal area in which it was trapped until the government of Thailand imposed a total ban on the export of primates in 1976 (Eudey, 1978). In recognition of their vulnerable status all primate species appear on either Appendix I (species threatened by extinction) or Appendix II (species which may become threatened with extinction without regulation of trade) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which was drafted in 1973 to insure international cooperation in protecting wild populations of animals and plants from exploitation through international traffic. Ethics and the Darwinian Revolution In order to discuss ethical concerns relating to the use and husbandry of primates, a definition of ethics is necessary. One meaning of the word is the "rules or standards governing the conduct of the members of a profession."' Another meaning is the "philosophy of morals" or the "study of the general nature of morals and of specific moral choices to be made by the individual in his relationship with others." In this context ethics stresses "objectively defined, although essentially idealistic, standards of right and wrong." If one were to expand the concept of "others" beyond our own species to include other species, then it should be possible to speak of a series of rules or ethics by which the conduct of those members of the biomedical community using primates is governed. However, it is my contention that the assumptions which currently underlie decisions as to what is ethically right or wrong with respect to the use of primates may require re-examination. Ideas expressed in the U.S. National Primate Plan, which was prepared by the Interagency Primate Steering Committee in 1978, will facilitate some of this review. In a 1972 article entitled "The nature of the Darwinian revolution," Ernst Mayr points out that only one of the few scientific revolutions, i.e., "rather drastic revisions of previously maintained assumptions and concepts," which has occurred involves the biological sciences rather than the physical sciences. This is the Darwinian revolution based upon the idea that natural selection or dif~ ferential reproduction is the most important, although not the exclusive, cause of evolutionary change. Mayr (1972:981) contends that this may be the "most fundamental of all intellectual revolutions in the history of mankind" because it affects religion, philosophy, and ethics as well as science. The following two conse97 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 2(2) 1981 Review Article A.Eudey quences of the Darwinian revolution are important to the topic under present consideration: (1) The refutation of the idea that evolutionary change is synonymous with progress, which is the direct outgrowth of the idea that all organisms occupy a link in a Chain of Being or rung in a Ladder of Perfection created in its present order by God, and thereby, of creationism itself, in that evolutionary change by adaptation does not necessitate continuous betterment. (2) The abolition of anthropocentrism, the concept that human beings are the central fact of the universe, by the idea that humans are part of the stream of evolution and occupy a place in nature with other organisms. These two aspects of the Darwinian revolution may be ignored or even rejected by scientists. The tendency to look at other species, including other primates, from the standpoint of one's own specialization, rather than assuming an holistic or evolutionary perspective, may be a contributing factor. The very terms commonly used to refer to primates other than humansnonhuman and subhumanreflect the pervasiveness of both anthropocentrism and creationism. The prefix "sub," which literally means "under or beneath" and also "inferior or secondary in rank" or "somewhat short of or less than," is especially pejorative. In 1972 at the IYth Congress of the International Primatological Society, Earl Count attempted to circumvent this bias by introducing the term alloprimates, which means simply "other primates." The Chain of Being or Ladder of Perfection is a static doctrine that recognizes no evolutionary transformations but only gradations in the supposed complexities of organisms. Following this line of reasoning, those animals ranked or classified as being closest to humans, the other primates, would appear asappropriate substitutes for ourselves. This kind of thinking may be in evidence in the National Primate Plan (IPSC, 1978) in statements such as the following: The essentiality of their use rests in large extent upon the relation of the nonhuman primates to the human primateman. These animals are man's closest relatives in the animal kingdom and are therefore indispensable allies in the effort to understand and control problems of human health (pages 1-2). The chimpanzee is the irreplaceable model for the study of human health problems. The alternative subject for such studies is man himself .... As man's surrogate for evaluation of many health hazards and health protective measures, this animal is without equal (page 62, emphasis added). The ultimate effect of such thinking, as I mentioned initially in this paper, may be to discourage the use of and search for alternatives to primates in biomedical research. At best it does not promote such use or search. For example, in a recent letter to Science (209:214, 1980), Dr. joe R. Held, former chairman of the National Institutes of Health Interagency Primate Steering Committee, makes the following statement: ... there are searchers for alternatives (to the use of research animals) for economic as well as humane reasons, but. .. it is unlikely alternatives will greatly reduce the number of animals needed in research and testing in the foreseeable future ... the /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 2(2) 1981 98