influence land - use decisions across state boundaries ?

This paper considers the fiscalization of land use in one state brought about by state regulation in a neighboring state. The idea that land use is ‘fiscalized,’ i.e. motivated by potential tax benefits, is well established in the literature (Chapman, 1988, 2008; Lewis, 2001; Wassmer, 2002; Pagano, 2004). The source of these motives is often attributed to a state’s control over the revenue structures of the cities within its jurisdiction. With increasing limits on the property taxing authority of municipalities, local governments have had to find creative ways to finance public services (Carroll & Sharbel, 2006). For example, Proposition 13 in California has left its municipalities highly dependent on sales tax revenues, making ‘mall wars’ between neighboring jurisdictions rather common. The extant literature, however, neglects an important issue. Many cities operate in metropolitan regions that cross state lines. In such a region, the state-level institutions faced by one city are different from those faced by another in the same metropolitan region. Thus, our objective is to extend the fiscalization logic beyond the "withinstate" focus and consider “cross-state” impacts on fiscalization of land use. More precisely we ask: how do the fiscal institutions of one state affect the land-use policies of cities in a different state within the same region? To address this question we draw on a case-study of two cities Kansas City, Missouri (KCM) and Kansas City, Kansas (KCK).