Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations
نویسندگان
چکیده
Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and strategyproofness. In particular, we present robust versions of envy-freeness and proportionality that are not only stronger than their standard counter-parts but also have less information requirements. We then focus on cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations and present three desirable algorithms: CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm), MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm) and CSD (Constrained Serial Dictatorship). CCEA is polynomial-time, robust envy-free, and non-wasteful. It relies on parametric network flows and recent generalizations of the probabilistic serial algorithm. For the subdomain of piecewise uniform valuations, we show that it is also group-strategyproof. Then, we show that there exists an algorithm (MEA) that is polynomial-time, envy-free, proportional, and Pareto optimal. MEA is based on computing a market-based equilibrium via a convex program and relies on the results of Reijnierse and Potters [24] and Devanur et al. [15]. Moreover, we show that MEA and CCEA are equivalent to mechanism 1 of Chen et. al. [12] for piecewise uniform valuations. We then present an algorithm CSD and a way to implement it via randomization that satisfies strategyproofness in expectation, robust proportionality, and unanimity for piecewise constant valuations. For the case of two agents, it is robust envy-free, robust proportional, strategyproof, and polynomial-time. Many of our results extend to more general settings in cake cutting that allow for variable claims and initial endowments. We also show a few impossibility results to complement our algorithms. The impossibilities show that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal subsets of properties that can be satisfied by any algorithm for piecewise constant valuation profiles.
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