A Refutation of Skeptical Theism

A Refutation of Skeptical Theism David Kyle Johnson The evidential problem of evil suggests that our awareness of the existence of seemingly unjustified evils reduces the epistemic probability of God’s existence. Arguments to this effect have been most famously and successfully championed by William Rowe. 1 His defense of the argument has developed over the years, but the basics of the argument itself have remained consistent—as have the criticisms. For example, his argument has always been subjected to some version of what has come to be known as the “skeptical theist’s objection.” As the defenses of Rowe’s argument changed, so too did the applications of skeptical theism, but the basic idea has remained the same: the fact that something seems to be an unjustified evil is no reason to think that it is an unjustified evil. Since God may have justifying reasons to allow evil that are beyond our ken, our awareness of an evil, and the fact that it seems unjustified, cannot reduce the probability of God’s existence. I will argue that skeptical theism is a movement doomed to fail. Contrary to the claims of skeptical theists, our awareness of seemingly unjustified evils increases the probability that unjustified evils exist and lowers the probability of God’s existence. Consequently, skeptical theism cannot succeed as a defense against Rowe’s evidential problem of evil. This will not show that atheism is, all things considered, true or more rational than theism; to establish that, a wealth of other arguments and supposed evidence for God’s existence would need to be considered. But, after I identify an ambiguity in the skeptical theist’s position, I will show that skeptical theism fails to establish that seemingly unjustified evil does not reduce the epistemic probability of God’s existence. No matter how skeptical theism is clarified to deal with the identified ambiguity, it will be undeniable that after the existence of an evil is identified, and it seems clear that there is no justifying reason to allow that evil, the epistemic probability that the evil is justified, and that God exists, drops.