Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists

نویسندگان

  • Hassan Benchekroun
  • Ngo Van Long
  • Gerhard Sorger
چکیده

Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners. CIRANO Le CIRANO est une corporation privée à but non lucratif constituée en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. La Série Scientifique est la réalisation d'une des missions que s'est données le CIRANO, soit de développer l'analyse scientifique des organisations et des comportements stratégiques. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research teams. The Scientific Series fulfils one of the missions of CIRANO: to develop the scientific analysis of organizations and strategic behaviour. Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations • École des Hautes Études Commerciales • École Polytechnique • McGill University • Université de Montréal • Université du Québec à Montréal • Université Laval • MEQ • MICST • Avenor • Banque Nationale du Canada • Bell Québec • Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec • Fédération des caisses populaires Desjardins de Montréal et de l'Ouest-du-Québec • Hydro-Québec • Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Paré • Société d'électrolyse et de chimie Alcan Ltée • Téléglobe Canada • Ville de Montréal Résumé / Abstract Règle de taxation permettant de réaliser l'optimalité pour un oligopole polluant. On considère une industrie oligopolistique dans laquelle la production s'accompagne d'émissions de pollution qui s'accumule pour former un stock. Dans ce modèle, les firmes se livrent une concurrence à la Cournot. Le gouvernement propose une règle de taxation pour corriger à la fois l'effet de …

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تاریخ انتشار 1997