Liberty, Games and Contracts

نویسندگان

  • Jan Narveson
  • John T. Sanders
چکیده

Edited by British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Liberty, games and contracts: Narveson and the defence of libertarianism 1.Narveson, Jan, 19362. Libertarianism 3. Contractarianism (Ethics) 1.Murray, Malcolm 320.5'12 MALCOLM MURRAY University of Prince Edward Island, Canada Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Liberty, games, and contracts: Jan Narveson and the defence oflibertarianism / edited by Malcolm Murray. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7546-5681-0 (hardcover: alk. paper) , 1. Libertarianism. 2. Social contract. 3. Contractarianism (Ethics) 4. Narveson, Jan, 1936-Political and social views. 1.Murray, R. Malcolm (Robert Malcolm), 1959II. Narveson, Jan, 1936-

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A Generalized Framework for Analyzing Capturing Races in Go

Capturing races or semeai are an important element of Go strategy and tactics. We extend previous work on semeai [1] by introducing a more general framework for analyzing semeai, based on the new concepts of conditional combinatorial games and liberty count games. We show how this framework encompasses earlier concepts such as plain liberty regions and plain eye regions. Furthermore, we discuss...

متن کامل

Cooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns

Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...

متن کامل

Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts

We study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation e¤ects in repeated games with long-run players. We proceed by extending the analysis of Abreu and Pearce (2007) by allowing for the possibility that di¤erent behavioral types may not be immediately distinguishable from each other. Given any prior over behavioral types, we construct a modi…ed pr...

متن کامل

The Optimality of Team Contracts

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable side-contracts on effort levels and realized returns. Standard constraints, resulting in incentive contracts, fa...

متن کامل

Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages

In an analysis of a model where many workers bargain with a ...rm and sign binding contracts, we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. If the production function satis...es decreasing returns, each worker receives a share of his marginal product (treating all other workers as employed) in equilibrium. Thus, wages are competitive. This is in contrast to Stole and Zweibel (1...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007