The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

One sometimes believes that P without grasping that P. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this fact. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a fact or proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.1 1This paper will appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Many thanks to Angela Mendelovici for extensive feedback and suggestions. Thanks also to David Chalmers, Steve Pearce, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the University of Houston, the 2013 Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting, Carleton University, and the Australian National University for helpful feedback and suggestions on this paper and/or ancestors of this paper.