Leadership in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Imperfect Monitoring and Communication1
نویسنده
چکیده
Leadership has often been proposed as a tool to aid in problems of collective action and social interaction. This is further supported by the presence of strong leaders in various social movements throughout history. In this paper, I represent social interaction with an n-person prisoners dilemma, where monitoring is imperfect monitoring and there is some form of communication available. I will develop a formal theory of leadership that not only demonstrates the importance of leadership in supporting collective action and cooperation but also shows how collective action problems themselves might facilitate the development of the institution of leadership.
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