Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information. We show that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce full, partial, or no revelation of the investor’s private information. A partial or non– revelation of information is optimal, when it mitigates an undersupply of effort by the entrepreneur due to moral hazard.
منابع مشابه
The Role of Uninformed Investors in an Optimal IPO Mechanism
This paper explores optimal ways for a firm to sell its initial public offering (IPO) to a mix of informed and uninformed investors through an intermediary. I argue that uninformed investors provide a benchmark for informed investors, resulting in an endogenous constraint that affects the issuer’s revenue. I conclude that higher revenues are achieved with higher numbers of uninformed investors ...
متن کاملOptimal Information Revelation with Uninformed Receiver
The first chapter studies optimal information revelation with one-sided asymmetric information. A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be revealed ex post. A receiver obtains both public information and information revealed by the sender, and then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender optimally r...
متن کاملA jump model for fads in asset prices under asymmetric information
This paper addresses how asymmetric information, fads and Lévy jumps in the price of an asset affect the optimal portfolio strategies and maximum expected utilities of two distinct classes of rational investors in a financial market. We obtain the investors’ optimal portfolios and maximum expected logarithmic utilities and show that the optimal portfolio of each investor is more or less than it...
متن کاملاندازه گیری سطح عدم تقارن اطلاعات برای شرکت های منتخب فعال در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران: احتمال مبادله آگاهانه(PIN)
The level of asymmetric information in financial markets is important for its impact on the market formation, price levels and its interaction with investment risk. Also, determining the optimal rules by policy makers and determining the trading strategy by investors is done according to the level of information symmetry in the market. In financial literature, many metrics have been developed t...
متن کاملFS IV 02 – 26 Delegation versus Authority
Delegation versus Authority by Daniel Krähmer The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. We contribute to the literature by ...
متن کامل