Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper presents repeated games with hidden moves, in which players receive imperfect private signals and are able to communicate. We propose a conditional probability approach to solve the learning problem in repeated games with correlated private signals and delayed communication. We then apply this approach to symmetric n-player games to obtain an approximate efficiency result. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; C73; D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 63 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008