Fairly Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Items
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, we study the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible items with the extra feature that the items lie on a line. Our goal is to find a fair allocation that is contiguous, meaning that the bundle of each agent forms a contiguous block on the line. While allocations satisfying the classical fairness notions of proportionality, envyfreeness, and equitability are not guaranteed to exist even without the contiguity requirement, we show the existence of contiguous allocations satisfying approximate versions of these notions that do not degrade as the number of agents or items increases. We also study the efficiency loss of contiguous allocations due to fairness constraints.
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