n o 3 Olson vs . Coase : coalitional worth in
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.
منابع مشابه
JOAN ESTEBAN and JÓZSEF SÁKOVICS OLSON VS. COASE: COALITIONAL WORTH IN CONFLICT
We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two dif...
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