Strategic Behavior in Judgment Aggregation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Complexity Results for Manipulation, Bribery and Control of the Kemeny Judgment Aggregation Procedure
An important criterium for social choice methods is their resistance against various types of strategic behavior. Seminal results in the social choice literature indicate that absolute resistance is in many cases impossible. For this reason, it has often been argued that computational intractability could be used as an obstruction for strategic behavior for different procedures. In this paper, ...
متن کاملComplexity Results for Manipulation, Bribery and Control of the Kemeny Procedure in Judgment Aggregation
We study the computational complexity of several scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure in the setting of judgment aggregation. In particular, we investigate (1) manipulation, where an individual aims to achieve a better group outcome by reporting an insincere individual opinion, (2) bribery, where an external agent aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by bribing...
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