Responsibility for Implicit Bias

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. On this way of thinking about bias and responsibility individuals may be responsible for responding to information that they are, most likely, beset by implicit biases; they may be blameworthy if they fail to put in place strategies for preventing their biases from having an effect on decisions (such as anonymizing CVs or essays). In other words, individuals may be blameworthy for failing to take responsibility for implicit biases once they are aware that they are likely to be influenced by them; but otherwise, individuals are not blameworthy for being biased, or for being influenced by implicit bias. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behavior and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counterproductive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are (sometimes) liable to blame could be constructive. In section 1, I set up what is meant by implicit bias, and the concerns that some philosophers have expressed about treating persons as liable to blame for their implicit biases. In section 2, I consider these arguments in detail, giving consideration to empirical studies and to the necessary conditions for responsibility posited. In doing so, we gain a clearer view on some of the kinds of factors that can influence the extent to which bias is manifested. Having concluded that we should reject the arguments canvassed for the conclusion that we are not liable to blame for biases, in section 3 I then go on to consider, and respond to, the concern that blaming individuals for implicit biases can be counterproductive.