Cabinet Reshuffles, Bureaucratic Capture, and Ministerial Drift

We model policy implementation in a parliamentary democracy as a game of delegation between the prime minister and his cabinet ministers. We show that cabinet reshuffles can be a pursued as a strategy to reduce the agency-loss which occurs due to the different preferences of the actors. Furthermore, when certain conditions are meet cabinet reshuffles have a dual effect; they reduce agency-loss and lower the cost associated with oversight. The results contrast sharply with the perceived wisdom, which maintains that cabinet reshuffles reduce the capability for policy implementation. ∗Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, H3C 3J7, Canada. Email: [email protected] †Department of Government & International Studies, 316 Gambrell Hall, University of South Carolina, Columbia SC 29208. Email: [email protected]. We thank James Alt, Steve Ansolabehere, Rob Franzese, Ben Klemens, and Arthur Lupia for sharing their thoughts on the projects with us. Any errors are naturally