Beyond accession conditionality and negotiations: Privatization, trade dynamics and the political economy of early post-communist economic transition

نویسنده

  • George Georgiadis
چکیده

Although the impact of the EU on the economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is undisputed, contemporary causal explanations focus primarily on the impact of accession negotiations and conditionality on CEE transformation and, as such, are limited to the post-1997 period. This poses a challenging empirical puzzle, because, in terms of their pace of transition, the CEECs distanced themselves from the rest of the post-communist countries in the pre-1997 period, i.e. at a time when accession negotiations and conditionality could not have had a causal impact. To fill in this vacuum in our understanding of transition and enhance our ability to explain the various forms of variation that have emerged since the early 1990s, this paper challenges the established view of the way in which the EU impacts domestic transformations in its periphery. Specifically the focus in this paper is shifted from accession negotiations and conditionality to establishing the significance of trade and privatization dynamics in early patterns of differentiation within the broader set of post-communist countries. Emphasis is placed on the impact of EU policies – in particular EU trade policy and the offer of the prospect of EU membership – on these dynamics. * The author is grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for its generous support that made possible the preparation of this paper.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Economic reform, democracy and growth during post-communist transition

The post-communist transition was associated with two specific phenomena. First, political liberalization was initiated simultaneously with economic reforms. Second, instead of a short Jshaped adjustment, most transition countries experienced deep and protracted recessions. Some analysts suggest that the early introduction of democracy was in fact harmful for economic growth. Similarly, propone...

متن کامل

Political Involvement in Industrial Conflict in Ukraine during the World Economic Crisis , 2008 - 2010

The paper contributes to the literature on the post-communist political economy of protest, and specifically to the question how governments handle public discontent with the outcomes of transition. The paper argues that the current economic crisis disrupts a key element of the post-Soviet political economy, workplace welfare. In the pre-crisis past, workplace welfare was found to contain worke...

متن کامل

Political Economy of Russian Trade Policy: Early Transition, Customs Unions, WTO Accession and Protection for Industrial Diversification

This paper discusses the political economy behind the principal trade policy decisions in Russia since independence. I discuss why export restraints were widely employed in the early transition years and why the export quotas proved more difficult to remove than anticipated. Why it was so difficult to resolve the monetary basis for the collapse in trade among the newly independent states. Why t...

متن کامل

Property Reform and Social Conflict - the analysis of agri- cultural ownership transformations in Post Communist Bulgaria

Land reform and the privatization of agricultural assets in transition is often explained with public choice arguments. These discuss the importance of links between interest groups, party competition and political program design. This paper adds a distributive bargaining concept to the general discussion of how institutions in transition emerge and develop. Based on empirical results, it allow...

متن کامل

Political economy of the Soviet elite and its post-communist transformation

A characteristic feature of Russian post-communist transformation is a high rate of elite continuity that invites an explanation of the demise of the Soviet Union as the result of a rational choice made by its ruling elite. This paper proposes a political-economic model where predatory ruling elite uses costly coercion to raise revenue from the working population, while resistance of the popula...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007