Kant and Empirical Psychology in the 18th Century

Kant lectured on anthropology for nearly 25 years, from 1772 until he retired in 1796. He subsequently went over his lecture notes for publication, and the resulting book—the last published under his supervision, in 1798—is presented here in translation, with a helpful introduction and explanatory notes. The lectures touched on many aspects of human cognition and behavior, including topics Kant called “empirical psychology.” The published version of these lectures is lighter and quicker than the philosophical works Kant wrote directly for publication. It is especially valuable for the window it offers into Kant’s thoughts on empirical psychology, and into the state of empirical psychology in his time. The range of topics covered in the lectures shows remarkable variety. Kant discussed self-consciousness and self-observation (pp. 9–17),1 unnoticed (or unconscious) ideas and mental processes (pp. 18–21), and the marks of perspicuous cognition (pp. 21–24). He distinguished sensation from thinking (pp. 24–28); described the proper relation between them (pp. 28–32); addressed cognitive facility, sensory illusion, and moral perception (pp. 32–40); and examined the five senses, memory, imagination, and dreams (pp. 40–83). He discussed the reading of natural and artificial signs (pp. 83–89). He described the three higher cognitive faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason; analyzed the weaknesses and illnesses to which they are subject; and offered advice on perfecting their use (pp. 90–129). He examined feelings of pleasure and pain and their proper role in human life (pp. 130–141), distinguished such feelings from aesthetic and moral judgments (pp. 141–147), and gave advice on cultivating good taste (pp. 148–154). He described the emotions and passions and how to control them (pp. 155–191). He considered how the character of persons can be known from comportment and physiognomy (pp. 195–215); offered observations on the character of the sexes (pp. 216–225); compared the characters of the French, British, Spanish, Italian, German, Greek, and Armenian peoples (pp. 225–236); and characterized the human species in relation to other terrestrial animals and to possible extraterrestrial rational beings (pp. 236–251). He offered advice on giving a good dinner party (pp. 187–190). And he analyzed the methodological problems that come with attempts at self-observation (pp. 5, 16–17). As is apparent, Kant’s Anthropology falls under several of today’s literary genres. Parts of it can be variously classed under theoretical psychology, philosophical psychology, cultural anthropology, etiquette, and self-improvement. The lectures were intended to give students knowledge of the world—which meant in this case knowledge of the human world—along with tips about how to better one’s self and to make one’s way (pp. 3–4). My interest here is the psychological content of the book, focusing on perception and cognition, which constitutes the largest single subpart. Although Kant frequently lectured on psychological topics in his course on metaphysics (a standard practice in 18th-century Germany),2 the Anthropology contains the single most important statement of his collected views on empirical knowledge of mind. I want to bring out what was new and interesting about the book in Kant’s day, to show what it reveals about Kant’s psychological theorizing and that of his time, and to define its larger significance for the history of psychology. Kant subtitled his book as anthropology “from a pragmatic point of view.” He distinguished this sort of anthropology from the “physiological” variety (p. 3). In Kant’s usage, “physiological” referred not specifically to the study of bodily structures and functions, but to the study of all of nature. In this case, the word “physiology” is another word for “physics,” or the theory of nature (both derive from the Greek root physis, meaning “nature”). A purely physiological anthropology would include the study of the physical characteristics of human beings, but it would not be equivalent to what is now called physical anthropology. It would also include the purely theoretical study of human mental faculties and their activity, considered as natural (hence physical or physiological) human functions. By contrast, pragmatic anthropology studies the human mind as it guides behavior, and human physical features as they influence and reflect character; it looks to the improvement of humankind. More specifically, it is concerned with “what man makes, can, or should make of himself as a freely acting being” (p. 3). So, whereas physiological anthropology might speculate about brain structures subserving memory, pragmatic anthropology asks how memory can be improved, and draws on theoretical knowledge only for this purpose. Similarly, the role of “obscure” or unnoticed ideas in sensation is a concern for the physiological, or natural scientific, study of the mind; it does not have pragmatic consequences because it cannot be brought under conscious control of the individual (pp. 19–20).