The Existence of Equilibria in the Leader-Follower Hub Location and Pricing Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
We propose a model where two competitors, a Leader and a Follower, are sequentially creating their hub and spoke networks and setting prices. The existence of the unique Stackelberg and Nash pricing equilibria is shown. On the basis of these results we give the conclusion about existence of the profit maximising solution for the Leader.
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