Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the general class of two-player public-policy contests and specify the asymmetry condition under which a more restrained government intervention that reduces the contestants’ prizes has the "perverse" effect of increasing their aggregate lobbying efforts.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 26 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006