Nber Working Paper Series Health Insurance as a Two-part Pricing Contract
نویسندگان
چکیده
For helpful comments and suggestions, we wish to thank Alan Garber, Dana Goldman, Geoffrey Joyce, Tomas Philipson, participants in the 2005 NBER Summer Institute Health Economics Workshop, and participants in the Fall 2006 NBER Health Care Program Meetings. We are grateful to the National Institute on Aging for funding. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
منابع مشابه
Health Insurance as a Two-Part Pricing Contract.
Monopolies appear throughout health care. We show that health insurance operates like a conventional two-part pricing contract that allows monopolists to extract profits without inefficiently constraining quantity. When insurers are free to offer a range of insurance contracts to different consumer types, health insurance markets perfectly eliminate deadweight losses from upstream health care m...
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