On Name Generation and Set-Based Analysis in the Dolev-Yao Model

On name generation and set-based analysis in Dolev-Yao model

Analysis of Security Protocolse

Several approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. Most formal approaches are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the “Dolev-Yao model.” In this paper, we use a formalism based on multiset rewriting to describe these modeling assumptions and explain how they are used in protocol analysis. The unifying formalism makes it possible to discuss general optimiz...

The Dolev-Yao Intruder is the Most Powerful Attacker

Most systems designed for the verification of security protocols operate under the unproved assumption that an attack can only result from the combination of a fixed number of message transformations, which altogether constitute the capabilities of the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder. In this paper, we prove that the Dolev-Yao intruder can indeed emulate the actions of an arbitrary adversary. In o...

A Structured Operational Modelling of the Dolev-Yao Threat Model

In the areas of computer security and cryptography a standard model for adversaries is the Dolev-Yao threat model . In the areas of formal analysis of complex, concurrent, communication and reactive systems, one of the foundations for formal analysis methodologies is a structured operational semantics (SOS) for Milner’s process algebra Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). In this paper we p...

CPDY: Extending the Dolev-Yao Attacker with Physical-Layer Interactions

We propose extensions to the Dolev-Yao attacker model to make it suitable for arguments about security of Cyber-Physical Systems. The Dolev-Yao attacker model uses a set of rules to define potential actions by an attacker with respect to messages (i.e. information) exchanged between parties during a protocol execution. As the traditional Dolev-Yao model considers only information (exchanged ove...