Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation: Supplemental Information
نویسنده
چکیده
1 Alignment of Members of Congress and Constituency 3 1.1 Literature on Members of Congress and Constituency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Demonstrating the Increasing Alignment and Sorting in Districts . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3 Connection to Constituent Sanction and Reelection Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 Number of Press Releases and Alignment 11 3 A General Indication of Discourse 12 4 Credit Claiming About Grants 13 5 Color and Full Name Version of Plots 14 6 Position Taking: Marginal and Aligned Representatives 14 7 Same Dimensions, Regardless of Scaling Methods 17 8 Stable Measures of Style 18 8.1 No Systematic Change With Shift In Electoral Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9 Alternative Measures of Partisanship and Effect on Home Style 26 ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University; Encina Hall West 616 Serra St., Palo Alto, CA, 94305
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Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation
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