The Behavior of Organisms: purposive behavior as a type of reflex.

Skinner's major goal in writing The BehaviorofOrganisms (1938) was to extend the rigor, simplicity, and lawfulness of the study of spinal reflexes (Crozier & Hoagland, 1934; Magnus, 1924; Sherrington, 1906) to the study of purposive behavior. As Skinner (1938) notes, "the older study of spinal reflexes and the modern study of behavior are logically and to a great extent historically continuous" (p. 378). Skinner's goal contrasts with the common tendency in psychological theory to draw a sharp distinction between reflexive and purposive behavior. Control of reflexive behavior typically is attributed to an external stimulus that need not engage a nervous level higher than the spinal cord. In contrast, purposive behavior has been attributed to mentalistic causes residing in the organism, such as thoughts, goals, purposes, attitudes, intentions, reason, will, desire, information processing, and decision making. Even among fellow learning psychologists interested in a reflex analysis of purposive behavior (e.g., Guthrie, 1930; Hull, 1937; Pavlov, 1928; Watson, 1916), Skinner's approach was unique. For most learning theorists, the extension of the reflex to purposive behavior was mediated by the mechanism of Pavlovian conditioning. Purposive behavior was explained as the chaining of covert conditioned reflexes. For Skinner, the common framework underlying reflexes and purposive behavior did not depend on any Pavlovian intermediary. To achieve his aim of a common framework for the study of purposive and reflexive behavior, Skinner had to surmount two obstacles.