What Good’s a Good Example? A New Objection to Counterfactual Exemplar-Based Virtue Theories

In the last decade or so, a special class of virtue theories has been carefully articulated by at least two able philosophers: Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zagzebski. Hursthouse and Zagzebski defend different versions of what we call counterfactual exemplar-based virtue theory. These theories are exemplar-based because they define key concepts in terms of characteristics, motivations, and actions of exemplary agents. They are counterfactual because they define key concepts not only in terms of the actual actions, motivations, etc. of virtuous exemplars, but also in terms of the actions and motivations of exemplars in non-actual possible worlds. To see just how these two features come into play in Hursthouse's and Zagzebski's theories, let us consider their definitions of right acts: [RH] An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances. [RZ] A right (permissible) act in some circumstances is an act the phronimos might do in like circumstances. That is, it is not the case that he characteristically would not do it. If he did it, he would not feel guilty. There are interesting differences between the two. Zagzebski's use of 'right action' is explicitly identified with permissible action (note the use of 'might'), while Hursthouse's use of the term seems more akin to obligatory action (note the use of 'would'). Zagzebski adds an emotional element (absence of guilty feeling) which is lacking in Hursthouse's definition. But for our purposes, the definitions are importantly similar. Both make fundamental reference to a virtuous agent, making them exemplar-based virtue theories. Both make fundamental reference to actions the virtuous agent might or would perform, making them counterfactual accounts. Both trade on