Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games

نویسندگان

  • Abraham Neyman
  • Rann Smorodinsky
چکیده

The asymptotic value, introduced by Kannai in 1966, is an asymptotic approach to the notion of the Shapley value for games with infinitely many players. A vector measure game is a game v where the worth v S of a coalition S is a function f of S where is a vector measure. Special classes of vector measure games are the weighted majority games and the two-house weighted majority games, where a two-house weighted majority game is a game in which a coalition is winning if and only if it is winning in two given weighted majority games. All weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. However, not all two-house weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. In this paper, we prove that the existence of infinitely many atoms with sufficient variety suffice for the existence of the asymptotic value in a general class of nonsmooth vector measure games that includes in particular two-house weighted majority games.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Math. Oper. Res.

دوره 29  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2004