A New Asymmetry Between Actions And Omissions*

In both cases, I couldn’t have prevented the ensuing death. However, intuitively, whereas I am morally responsible (‘‘responsible,’’ for short) for Victim’s death in Shooting, I am not responsible for the child’s death in Sharks. Shooting is a ‘‘Frankfurt-style’’ case. In a Frankfurt-style case, it has been argued, an agent is responsible for something that he couldn’t have prevented. Thus, in Shooting, I couldn’t have failed to kill Victim, but I am still responsible for his death. For I freely made the decision to shoot and I freely acted on that decision (the neuroscientist didn’t have to intervene). By contrast, in Sharks, I am not responsible for the child’s death. I freely decided to stay on the shore, and the sharks didn’t have to intervene, but, somehow, the fact that I couldn’t have saved the child given that the water