On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove the generic equivalence between quasi-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Combining this result with Blume and Zame (1994) shows that perfect, quasi-perfect and sequential equilibrium coincide in generic games.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014