A Folk Theorem for One-Shot Bertrand Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that bounded monopoly profits are essential for the uniqueness of the Bertrand paradox (zero profit) outcome. Otherwise, a folk theorem obtains for one-shot homogeneous product Bertrand games: any positive (but finite) payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. JEL Numbers: D43, C72
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