Guest Editor's Introduction: Infrastructure Security--Reliability and Dependability of Critical Systems

Electrical Of particular importance is the reliable availability of inexpensive, secure, high-quality electrical power and high-performance communication networks. The Northeast/Canadian blackout of August 2003, European outages in summer 2003, the Western US states’ power crisis from 2000 to 2001, and the growing prevalence of Internet hacker attacks and email viruses demonstrate that these key infrastructures are highly vulnerable to either accidental or intentional failure. The North American power network could realistically be considered the largest and most complex machine in the world—its transmission lines connect all electric generation and distribution on the continent. In that respect, it exemplifies many of the complexities of electric power infrastructure and how technological innovation, combined with efficient markets and enabling policies, can address them. The US National Academy of Engineering has declared the North American electrical grid to be the supreme achievement of the 20th century. However, the interconnected nature of networks means that single, isolated disturbances can cascade through and between networks with potentially disastrous consequences. Because the electric power infrastructure underpins all other critical infrastructures, it’s particularly vulnerable to deliberate as well as accidental disturbances. Both the importance and difficulty of protecting power systems has long been recognized. In 1990, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the US Congress issued a detailed report, Physical Vulnerability of the Electric System to Natural Disasters and Sabotage, concluding, “Terrorists could emulate acts of sabotage in several other countries and destroy critical [power system] components, incapacitating large segments of a transmission network for months. Some of these components are vulnerable to saboteurs with explosives or just high-power rifles.” The report also documented the potential cost of widespread electrical outages; in the New York City outage of 1977, for example, damage from looting and arson alone cost near US$155 million—roughly half of the outage’s total cost. During the 15 years since the OTA report, the situation has become even more complex. In addition to physical vulnerability, we must also consider power systems’ increased susceptibility to disruptions in computer networks and communications systems. To improve operating efficiency, power system control has become more centralized, which MASSOUD AMIN University of Minnesota Infrastructure Security: Reliability and Dependability of Critical Systems