How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand – A Structural Analysis of Behavioral Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection∗
نویسنده
چکیده
Individuals with health insurance use more health care. One reason is that health care is cheaper for the insured. Additionally, having insurance can encourage unhealthy behavior via moral hazard. Previous work studying the effect of health insurance on medical utilization has mostly ignored behavioral changes due to having health insurance, and how that in turn affects medical utilization. This paper investigates the structural causal relationships among health insurance status, health behavior, and medical utilization theoretically and empirically, and separates price effects from behavioral moral hazard effects. Also distinguished are the extensive vs. intensive margins of insurance effects on behavior JEL Codes: C51, I12, D12
منابع مشابه
Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis
Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural mode...
متن کاملA Semiparametric Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Contracts
The last decade has been characterized by unprecedented inflation in health care expenditures. One commonly suggested source for this inflation is the distortion in the health insurance market due to asymmetric information about the latent health status of individuals that leads to adverse selection in health insurance contracts and run away medical expenditures due to moral hazard. In this pap...
متن کاملAdverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important policy implications. For example, if adverse selection effects are small while moral hazard effects are large, conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory insurance enrolment) may lead to substantial increases in health care spending. Unfortunately, there i...
متن کاملAsymmetric Information in Iranian's Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.
BACKGROUND Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of insurance market via its two consequences, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. OBJECTIVE Th...
متن کاملBasic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection ¬リニ
a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: I13 D82 H51 Keywords: Universal basic health insurance Voluntary supplementary insurance Public vs. private insurance Adverse selection Moral hazard Cost effectiveness This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatmen...
متن کامل