An Empirical Model of Multi-unit, Sequential, Ascending-price Auctions∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We construct a model of participation and bidding at multi-unit, sequential, ascending-price auctions when bidders can potentially have multi-unit demand. We then describe conditions sufficient to characterize a strategic equilibrium of the auction game. Subsequently, we demonstrate that this equilibrium induces an efficient allocation and then propose an algorithm to calculate the expected winning price for each unit sold. We use this algorithm to develop a simulation-based, structural-econometric estimation strategy to calculate parameter estimates of both the participation process and the distribution of latent valuations using commonly-available data. We illustrate the feasibility of our approach by applying it to data from a small sample of timber export-permit auctions held in the Krasnoyarsk Region of Russia. JEL Classification Numbers: C1, C4, C7, L1, P3, Q2.
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