On the Expected Value of Games with Absentmindedness
نویسندگان
چکیده
Piccione and Rubinstein argue that a seemingly paradoxical form of time inconsistency can arise in games of imperfect recall. Their argument depends on calculating the expected value of a game from the standpoint of a player in the middle of play. We claim that this concept is not well deened in games with ab-sentmindedness (where two nodes on a path can be in the same information set) without additional assumptions. We show that, under some reasonable assumptions , no time inconsistency arises. Diierent assumptions will validate Piccione and Rubinstein's calculations, but these are such as to remove the appearance of paradox.
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