Tit-For-Tat Strategy for Increasing Medical Student Evaluation Response Rates
نویسندگان
چکیده
Introducation It is essential for faculty to receive feedback on their teaching for the purpose of improvement as well as promotion. It can be challenging to motivate students to provide feedback to preceptors and fill out evaluation forms when not a clerkship requirement. Furthermore, there is concern that making the evaluations a requirement can compromise the quality of the feedback. The objective of this study was to identify an increase in the number of faculty and resident evaluations completed by students rotating through their Emergency Medicine clerkship following the implementation of a tit-for-tat incentive strategy. Method Prior to the implementation of Tit-for-Tat, students rotating through their emergency medicine clerkship were asked to fill out evaluations of residents and faculty members with whom they worked. These were encouraged but voluntary. Beginning in the 2014-2015 academic year, a tit-for-tat strategy was employed whereby students had to complete a resident or faculty evaluation in order to view the student assessment completed by that resident or faculty preceptor. Results Students submitted 1101 evaluations in the control, with a mean of 3.60 evaluations completed per student and 3.77 evaluations received per preceptor. Following the implementation of tit-for-tat, students submitted 2736 evaluations, with a mean of 8.19 evaluations completed per student and 7.52 evaluations received per preceptor. Both the increase in evaluations completed per student and evaluations received per preceptor were statistically significant with p-value <0.001. Conclusion The tit-for-tat strategy significantly increased the number of evaluations submitted by students rotating through their emergency medicine clerkship. This has served as an effective tool to increase the overall number of evaluations completed, the number of evaluations each instructor received on average and the proportion of students that completed evaluations. Further work could be done to attempt to better assess the quality of the feedback from these evaluations.
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